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INTRODUCTION
President George W. Bush and his executive branch lawyers have earned
widespread and often scathing criticism for their extreme positions and
practices regarding the scope of presidential authority. The war on terror that
followed the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks provided the context for their
most controversial claims of unilateral authority: to override legal prohibitions
on the use of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; to hold
“enemy combatants” indefinitely without access to counsel or any opportunity
to challenge their detention; and to engage in domestic electronic surveillance
without a court order. The administration’s efforts to expand presidential
power, however, were not confined to post-9/11 national security issues; they
date from President Bush’s earliest days in office and include, for example,
adherence to “unitary executive” theories of sweeping presidential control of
the executive branch.1


Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law – Bloomington. This Article
builds upon my presentation at the Boston University School of Law conference on
Presidential Power in the Twenty-First Century. I am grateful to Professor Gary Lawson,
the student editors of the Boston University Law Review, and all who took part in an
excellent conference. I also would like to thank Neil Kinkopf and Jeff Powell for their
suggestions on a draft of this Article, and my research assistants Jeffrey Macey and Aaron
Stucky for their outstanding help.
1 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 89 (2007) (“[Vice President Dick] Cheney
and the President told top aides at the outset of the first term that past presidents had
‘eroded’ presidential power, and that they wanted ‘to restore’ it so that they could ‘hand off
a much more powerful presidency’ to their successors.” (citation omitted)); CHARLIE
SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 73 (2007) (describing a mandate given at the first White House
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Our Nation’s welfare and integrity depend upon continued evaluation,
response, and, when warranted, condemnation of these practices, even beyond
President Bush’s time in office. The Bush administration’s abuses threaten to
distort presidential authority and the federal balance of powers for years and
administrations to come. Motivated by this administration’s actions, many
commentators (including me) have proposed reforms and principles to guide
future administrations and to encourage Congress and the courts to impose
appropriate external checks.2
This Article, however, urges due care in the formulation of such critiques
and reforms, especially regarding the Bush administration’s efforts to advance
its constitutional views. Critics should be precise with their objections and
recommendations in order to avoid undermining future Presidents’ legitimate
authorities or otherwise disrupting the proper balance of governmental powers.
The Bush administration’s abuses – especially its claims of authority to refuse
to comply with federal statutes – reinforce the need for articulated standards
and effective safeguards to ensure lawful conduct. However, those abuses do
not obviate the existence or desirability of legitimate presidential authority.
Among the powers President Bush has placed at risk is the longstanding and
necessary authority of Presidents, with the help of their executive branch
lawyers, to interpret the Constitution in ways that go beyond judicial precedent
and congressional determinations.
I.

THE BUSH LEGACY FOR PRESIDENTIAL POWER

Prominent commentators have speculated with some disagreement about the
likely effects of the Bush presidency on the future strength of executive power.
Their assessments underscore what is at stake. Professor Jack Goldsmith, who
served as a high-ranking official in President Bush’s Department of Justice,
has written a valuable insider’s account.3 Goldsmith concludes that the
“harmful suspicion and mistrust” engendered by President Bush’s unnecessary
unilateralism – his attempts to exclude Congress and the courts – can be
expected to diminish executive power.4 Goldsmith notes the irony of this

Counsel staff meeting of the Bush presidency: “They were to be vigilant about seizing any
opportunity to expand presidential power. Bush had told him, [Counsel to the President
Alberto] Gonzales said, that the institutional powers of the presidency had been weakened
by his predecessors.”); id. at 9 (quoting a 1996 speech by Vice President Cheney: “I think
there have been times in the past, oftentimes in response to events such as Watergate or the
war in Vietnam, where Congress has begun to encroach upon the powers and
responsibilities of the President; that it was important to go back and try to restore that
balance.”).
2 E.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on
Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2007) [hereinafter Johnsen, Faithfully Executing
the Laws].
3 See generally GOLDSMITH, supra note 1.
4 Id. at 140.
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prospect, given the administration’s overriding goal of expanding presidential
authority:
It was said hundreds of times in the White House that the President and
Vice President wanted to leave the presidency stronger than they found it.
In fact they seemed to have achieved the opposite. They borrowed
against the power of future presidencies – presidencies that, at least until
the next attack, and probably even following one, will be viewed by
Congress and the courts, whose assistance they need, with a harmful
suspicion and mistrust because of the unnecessary unilateralism of the
Bush years.5
Due to his support of both a relatively strong presidency and many of President
Bush’s policy objectives,6 Goldsmith laments the potential loss of some
executive power even as he criticizes the Bush administration for egregious
power grabs. Goldsmith maintains that President Bush would have been more
successful and presidential authority more secure if, rather than repeatedly
seeking to go-it-alone in secret, he had sought congressional support more
often.7 To support this assessment, Goldsmith cites the Supreme Court’s
aggressive review of the administration’s unilateral policies8 and Congress’s
general willingness to support those policies.9
Boston Globe reporter Charlie Savage has authored an impressively
exhaustive analysis of the damage President Bush has inflicted on the balance
of governmental powers.10 He and Goldsmith agree on much, including the
extreme nature of the Bush administration’s unilateralism, which they both so
ably document. In contrast to Goldsmith, Savage emphasizes that President
Bush pushed the limits of executive authority in dangerous ways that likely
will outlast his presidency.11 They both are almost certainly right that Bush’s

5

Id.
See, e.g., id. at 28.
7 See, e.g., id. at 205-13 (comparing the Bush administration’s “go-it-alone approach”
with President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s approach of broad consultation within and without
his administration on wartime decisions).
8 See id. at 134-37; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
9 GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 138-40 (discussing Congress’s passage of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 and opining that the Bush administration “surely could have
received an even more accommodating military commission system if they had made the
push in Congress in 2002-2003 instead of the fall of 2006”).
10 SAVAGE, supra note 1, at 123 (describing the Bush administration’s legal opinions as
seeking to “eliminate nearly all the checks and balances that have been traditionally
understood to limit the power of the president”).
11 Id. at 330 (quoting Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson’s observation in his dissent
from Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944), that any new claim of executive
power “lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring
6
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legacy will include lasting effects on the scope of presidential power. Whether
those effects will take the form of an expansion or contraction of presidential
power will likely vary with the particular issue, but I believe that Savage has
identified the greater danger.
Expansions in presidential power typically prove difficult to roll back.
Lawyers at the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice are
the government lawyers charged with assessing the legality of proposed
executive branch action, and OLC’s advice traditionally is considered binding
on the executive branch unless overruled by the President or the attorney
general. Savage aptly observes a tendency for OLC recognition of presidential
power to act as a one-way ratchet, with OLC experiencing greater difficulty
telling a President that legal obstacles prevent him from taking a desired action
if one or more of his predecessors had concluded that they possessed the
relevant authority.12 Moreover, OLC expressly relies on a version of stare
decisis in its legal interpretations, looking to past OLC and attorney general
opinions.13
Regardless of who proves correct about the general post-Bush direction of
presidential power, there is some risk that reactions to the Bush experience –
public sentiment, political considerations, or mistaken constitutional
understandings – might distort outcomes and harm legitimate and valuable
executive powers. Commentators certainly should not mute their principled
criticism, but they should avoid imprecise and over-generalized reactions that
might undermine the ability of future Presidents to exercise legitimate
authorities.
One particularly prominent presidential authority at risk is executive
privilege, which allows Presidents to withhold certain information from
Congress, the courts, and the public. Executive privilege, even at its best, is an
unpopular presidential authority because its exercise comes at a very high cost:
lost governmental accountability. The privilege is especially vulnerable in the
wake of a President who has abused it or operated with unwarranted secrecy,
both of which describe the Bush presidency. President Bush’s assertions of
executive privilege to withhold information regarding the allegedly improper
firing of several U.S. Attorneys, coupled with his administration’s pervasive
secrecy, may diminish the ability of President Bush’s successors to raise
legitimate executive privilege claims – just as the corruption and secrecy of
Richard Nixon’s administration made assertion of the privilege far more
difficult for his successors. Now-Justice Antonin Scalia acknowledged this
Nixon legacy when, in 1975, as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
Legal Counsel, he testified before a Senate subcommittee. Commenting on

forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more
deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.”).
12 Id. at 329.
13 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 145.
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post-Watergate legislation seeking to limit executive privilege, Scalia told the
committee:
I realize that anyone saying a few kind words about Executive privilege
after the events of the last few years is in a position somewhat akin to the
man preaching the virtues of water after the Johnstown flood, or the
utility of fire after the burning of Chicago. But fire and water are, for all
that, essential elements of human existence. And Executive privilege is
indispensable to the functioning of our system of checks and balances and
separation of powers.14
Although I believe Presidents should be extremely reluctant to assert executive
privilege and often disagree with Justice Scalia’s views on separation of
powers issues, his observations here convey the importance of distinguishing
between the legitimacy of an executive authority and specific abuses of that
authority.
This Article will focus on a second, less prominent issue of presidential
authority that is at risk in the wake of the mounting and merited criticism of the
Bush presidency: the President’s authority to interpret the Constitution. Like
executive privilege, it is an authority susceptible to grave presidential abuse.
When properly exercised, however, presidential constitutional interpretation
can be legitimate and valuable. Commentators should not confuse their
objections to a particular President’s substantive constitutional views and
practices with objections to the legitimacy of the underlying presidential
authority.
The risk of such conflation can be seen, for example, in a December 2007
remark by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse. Whitehouse attacked the Bush
administration for asserting the position that “[t]he President, exercising his
constitutional authority under Article II, can determine whether an action is a
lawful exercise of the President’s authority under Article II.”15 Senator
Whitehouse has earned commendation for his forceful and able critiques of the
Bush administration’s abuses. Here, too, his concern is warranted, but he
seems to misplace his objections. Presidents not only can, but they must
determine whether their actions are lawful (subject, of course, to appropriate
judicial review). Moreover, in many circumstances, Presidents may develop,
declare, and act upon distinctive, principled constitutional views that do not
track those of the Supreme Court or Congress. The problem lies not with the
fact that President Bush, with the help of his lawyers, assessed the scope of his
constitutional authority before acting, but with the flawed content of his legal

14 Executive Privilege – Secrecy in Government: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Intergovernmental Relations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Opers., 94th Cong. 125 (1975)
(statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel).
15 Press Release, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, In FISA Speech, Whitehouse Sharply
Criticizes Bush Administration’s Assertion of Executive Power (Dec. 7, 2007), available at
http://whitehouse.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=288537&.
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determinations and the ways in which he secretly acted upon them.16 Such
concerns with how President Bush abused his authority undoubtedly motivated
Senator Whitehouse, but he chose a formulation that seemed to impugn
legitimate executive authority.
The Bush administration itself is largely to blame for misplaced attacks and
confusion. It has consistently engaged in excessive secrecy about the
substance of its legal interpretations and has neglected to explain publicly how
it views its own interpretive authority. Senator Whitehouse, for example,
made his comments after reviewing OLC opinions on the legality of the Bush
administration’s surveillance program. The administration, however, refused
to release publicly these and many other OLC opinions and sharply constrained
Senator Whitehouse’s ability to reveal their content as a condition of sharing
them with him.17
The Bush administration’s constitutional views on executive authority, as
revealed, for example, in other OLC opinions that have been leaked or released
under pressure, suggest likely bases for Senator Whitehouse’s valid concerns.
When assessing their own authority, Presidents are constitutionally obligated
to act on their good faith, best interpretations of applicable legal constraints.18
The Bush administration, to the contrary, has at times acted on policy
preferences and a generalized desire to expand presidential power. Further,
President Bush has advanced extreme constitutional positions outside the
mainstream of legal thought and unsupported by judicial precedent without due
consideration of whether the context affords him that authority. Most striking
in this regard, President Bush has inadequately attended to the nature of the
particular constitutional authority that he was exercising and to whether
Congress had spoken to the issue. He has declared provisions unconstitutional
with seeming equal ease whether opining on draft legislation, vetoing a bill,
signing a bill into law, or declaring the authority to violate an existing statutory
prohibition. Even when a President makes a sincere effort to assess the
constitutionality of a legislative provision, whether he may act on that
interpretation depends on the context. As previous administrations have found
and past practice confirms,19 presidential decisions not to comply with federal

16 For
similar assessments, see Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/12/whitehouse-blames-white-house-but-he.html (Dec. 8,
2007, 10:43); Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/
12/misdirected-outrage.html (Dec. 8, 2007, 17:03).
17 See Posting of Marty Lederman, supra note 16.
18 See Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws, supra note 2, at 1576-1601 (describing
the President’s obligations and OLC’s traditional practices and advocating principles to
guide OLC’s legal interpretations).
19 See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 199, 203 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Dellinger Memorandum]; The Attorney
General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 55, 55-56 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Civiletti Memorandum].
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statutes raise concerns different and far more grave than almost any other
context in which Presidents advance their constitutional views.20
II.

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S RECORD ON CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION

During the October 2007 confirmation hearings for now-Attorney General
Michael Mukasey, it seemed the Senate might directly challenge the Bush
administration’s failure adequately to respect Congress and its statutes. The
Senate Judiciary Committee’s questions reflected concerns about the Bush
administration’s politicization of the Department of Justice.21 Senators
(including Senator Whitehouse) explored whether Mukasey, unlike his
predecessor Alberto Gonzales, would appropriately advise the President of his
constitutional obligation to uphold the rule of law and comply with federal
statutes. Senators also questioned President Bush’s use of signing statements
to signal his potential noncompliance with acts of Congress he found
constitutionally questionable, even as he signed bills into law.
On day two of the hearings, virtually all public attention narrowed to one
explosive context in which the Bush administration had acted contrary to legal
constraints: the use of extreme methods of interrogation. Mukasey jeopardized
what had seemed his certain confirmation by joining the Bush administration’s
refusal to acknowledge the illegality of waterboarding, a long-recognized form
of torture that subjects a prisoner to the terror of drowning.22 The United
States’ use of waterboarding certainly merited outrage, for it jeopardized the
Nation’s moral and international standing and the safety of its military and
intelligence agents abroad.23 This waterboarding focus, however, eclipsed the
20 In assessing the legitimacy of the Bush administration’s actions and possible lessons to
be drawn from its abuses, this Article draws upon earlier articles in which I discussed
presidential authority to interpret the Constitution. See generally Dawn E. Johnsen,
Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines
Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004) [hereinafter Johnsen,
Functional Departmentalism]; Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of
Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2000) [hereinafter
Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement].
21 Executive Nomination: Hearing on the Nomination of Michael B. Mukasey To Be
Attorney General of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
(2007).
22 See Dan Eggen, Mukasey Losing Democrats’ Backing; Nominee Unsure If
Waterboarding Breaks Torture Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2007, at A1; Dan Eggen, Torture
Stance Raises Doubts on Mukasey, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2007, at A2; Emily Bazelon,
Rebound Relationship: The Senate Runs Into the Arms of Michael Mukasey, S LATE, Oct. 17,
2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2176121/.
23 One illustration of the potential damage is the Bush administration’s refusal to
acknowledge that waterboarding would be unlawful if used by other nations against U.S.
forces abroad. See Josh White, Evidence From Waterboarding Could Be Used in Military
Trials, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2007, at A4; A Decision Was Made Not To Talk About These
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also serious concern that President Bush, with the backing of his new Attorney
General, might continue to violate a range of federal statutes – and might do so
in secret, thereby avoiding public accountability.
The Bush administration’s extraordinary disregard of statutes, even statutes
treating the issue of interrogation, was fundamentally misunderstood and
misreported, indicating the state of public confusion. For example, the
Washington Post editorialized that the Senate should confirm Mukasey but
also enact new legislation prohibiting waterboarding.24 Astonishingly, the
editorial failed to explain that multiple international and domestic laws already
criminalized waterboarding, as well as other extreme techniques that the Bush
administration had utilized but that had escaped the public notoriety of
waterboarding. The true problem was the Bush administration’s refusal
faithfully to interpret and apply those existing laws. As Georgetown law
professor Marty Lederman explained, the Washington Post’s strained effort at
“Solomonic wisdom” failed utterly: waterboarding not only fell within existing
prohibitions, but any new legislation faced President Bush’s certain veto.25
President Bush, of course, is not the first President with an aggressive view
of his own interpretive authority. Throughout history, Presidents on occasion
have advanced and acted upon constitutional interpretations distinct from those
of the courts and Congress, sometimes famously and momentously.26 Nor is
President Bush the first to allow political and policy objectives to infect his
constitutional interpretations. The Bush administration, however, clearly falls
at an extreme on the historical spectrum.
If anything positive can be attributed to the Bush administration’s
interpretive abuses, it is a heightened public awareness of the critical need for
scrutiny of executive branch legal interpretations and interpretive practices.
The federal government’s political branches lack some of the judiciary’s
institutional protections and practices that help to minimize political influences
on legal interpretation – such as life tenure, an adversarial system, and
Things, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Nov. 5, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/
0,,2204442,00.html (transcript of a debate between John Bellinger, State Department Legal
Advisor, and Philippe Sands, professor of law at University College London).
24 Editorial, Mr. Mukasey and Torture; The Senate Should Confirm the Former and Ban
the Latter, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2007, at A20. Senator Chuck Schumer similarly explained
his decision to support Mukasey – support that may have been critical to his confirmation –
as due to Mukasey’s private assurances that if Congress enacted yet another law, this time
specifically criminalizing waterboarding by name, he would urge the administration to
comply. Charles Schumer, Op-Ed., A Vote for Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007, at A29;
see also Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Undecided Schumer May Be Key to Mukasey’s Chances,
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2007, at A3.
25 Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/11/
washington-post-jumps-shark.html (Nov. 2, 2007, 03:39). In March 2008, President Bush,
in fact, did veto the new legislation endorsed by the Washington Post. Steven Lee Myers,
Veto of Bill on C.I.A. Tactics Affirms Bush’s Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at A1.
26 See infra notes 58-62, 79-81, 90-94 and accompanying text.
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published opinions.
Executive branch legal interpretations that are
unsupported by judicial precedent therefore warrant close examination. In
order to help illustrate, I will briefly describe three of the Bush
administration’s most controversial policies: those involving torture,
warrantless domestic surveillance, and signing statements. 27
Perhaps most infamous, a 2002 secret OLC legal memorandum commonly
known as the “Torture Memo” concluded that the President, as Commander in
Chief, possessed the constitutional authority to authorize government officials
to engage in torture, notwithstanding a federal statute that criminalized such
action.28 Jack Goldsmith, who began his service as the head of OLC about a
year after the Torture Memo was issued, but before it was leaked to the public,
has explained that he found it so “deeply flawed” and “sloppily reasoned” that
he felt he had to either withdraw the advice or resign from OLC.29 Ultimately,
he did both. Goldsmith prepared a total of three letters of resignation during
the nine months he served at OLC.30 Goldsmith’s successor at OLC, Daniel
Levin, reportedly also resigned over the torture issue while working on a
never-finished memo that would have imposed tighter controls on interrogation
techniques.31
In December 2005, Congress responded to the leak of the Torture Memo, as
well as reports of abuse at the Iraqi Abu Ghraib prison and other sites overseas,
by imposing criminal penalties not only for torture but also for cruel and
inhuman treatment of persons detained by the United States anywhere in the
world.32 OLC reportedly again issued a secret opinion interpreting the more

27 Numerous press and other commentators have provided detailed analyses of the Bush
administration’s abuses of its authority to interpret the law. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra
note 1; SAVAGE, supra note 1; Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, WASH.
POST, June 27, 2007, at A1; Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, A Different Understanding With
the President, WASH. POST, June 24, 2007, at A1; Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, The Unseen
Path to Cruelty, WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, at A1.
28 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002). The Bush administration
disavowed the Torture Memo when it leaked to the public and OLC eventually issued a new
memorandum to replace it. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att’y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y
Gen., Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004).
29 GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 10; see also id. (“I was astonished, and immensely
worried, to discover that some of our most important counterterrorism policies rested on
severely damaged legal foundations.”).
30 Id.
31 Jan Crawford Greenburg & Ariane de Vogue, Bush Administration Blocked
Waterboarding Critic, ABC NEWS, Nov. 2, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/DOJ/story?
id=3814076.
32 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
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restrictive interrogation prohibition to allow the government to continue using
techniques, such as waterboarding, commonly viewed as torture and cruel and
inhuman treatment.33 In November 2007, within a week of Michael
Mukasey’s confirmation, the Bush administration issued a statement of policy
vowing to veto a bill aimed at clarifying which interrogation methods were
prohibited.34 The statement also flatly proclaimed that there was no need for
any further legislation regarding interrogation.35 As of March 2008, Mukasey
and other administration officials continued to refuse to acknowledge the
illegality of waterboarding under existing laws.36 And that same month
President Bush vetoed a bill that would have even more explicitly prohibited
the government from using waterboarding and other extreme methods.37
The Bush administration used a similar extreme and implausible
Commander-in-Chief theory as part of its justification for a second highly
controversial counterterrorism practice:38 years of electronic surveillance here
in the United States without complying with the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA).39 FISA allows the government secretly to request a
court order, without notification of the target, from a special FISA court that
almost invariably grants such requests.40 For several years after 9-11, the Bush
administration secretly stopped complying with even this modified court order
requirement as part of what it called its Terrorist Surveillance Plan, until its

33

Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at A1. The administration’s excessive secrecy,
including its refusal to release OLC opinions and other information of great public interest,
unfortunately makes necessary reliance on news reports and government leaks for the
existence and content of OLC advice and other information regarding how the
administration is conducting the war on terror.
34 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 4156 – MAKING EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING
SEPTEMBER 30, 2008, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 1 (2007).
35 Id. at 2.
36 Dan Eggen, Justice Official Defends Rough CIA Interrogations, W ASH. POST, Feb. 17,
2008, at A3; Dan Eggen, Mukasey Hints at Wider CIA Probe, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2008, at
A2.
37 Myers, supra note 25.
38 See Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 19, 2006), reprinted in David Cole
& Martin S. Lederman, The National Security Agency’s Domestic Spying Program:
Framing the Debate, 81 IND. L.J. 1355, 1374 (2006).
39 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978)
(subsequently amended by Protect America Act, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007)).
40 See David Johnston & Neil Lewis, Defending Spy Program, Administration Cites Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A20.
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desire to avoid impending judicial review prompted it to work out a stillundisclosed, allegedly lawful arrangement with the FISA court.41
A still-secret component of this Terrorist Surveillance Plan led to one of the
most shocking and colorful incidents among the Bush administration’s rule-oflaw abuses. When then-Acting Attorney General James Comey refused to
approve the legality of this program (on the advice of Jack Goldsmith, who
subsequently described the program as “the biggest legal mess I’ve ever
encountered”),42 then-Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales and White
House Chief of Staff Andrew Card did not accept Comey’s determination.
Gonzales and Card instead rushed to the hospital bedside of John Ashcroft,
who was recovering in intensive care from surgery and had temporarily
transferred his authority as Attorney General to Comey. Both Comey and
Goldsmith have testified before Congress about their dramatic race through
Washington, D.C., in an effort to arrive at the hospital first, out of fear that
Gonzales and Card would attempt to pressure a very ill and sedated Ashcroft
into authorizing the program.43 They testified also that Ashcroft in the end
stood firmly by Comey and Goldsmith, and President Bush ordered the
program changed, but only under the intense pressure created by the threat of
mass resignations from the Department of Justice leadership.44
A third and final example: President Bush has abused the presidential
practice of issuing statements simultaneous with signing a bill into law. He
has come under intense fire for including in signing statements an
unprecedented number of objections to the constitutionality of provisions
within the bills.45 By one count, he had objected to the constitutionality of

41

The Bush administration and the FISA court refuse to release the details of that
arrangement. Matt Apuzzo, Secretive Spy Court Refuses to Reveal Wiretap Rules, STARLEDGER (NEWARK), Dec. 12, 2007, at 6.
42 Preserving the Rule of Law in the Fight Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Goldsmith Testimony] (statement
of Jack Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, former
Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice).
43 Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the
Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys? – Part IV: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Comey Testimony] (testimony of James B.
Comey, former Deputy U.S. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice); Goldsmith Testimony, supra note
42, at 14-15; see also Dan Eggen, White House Secrecy on Wiretaps Described, WASH.
POST, Oct. 3, 2007, at A5; Dana Milbank, Ashcroft and the Night Visitors, WASH. POST,
May 16, 2007, at A2.
44 Goldsmith Testimony, supra note 42; see also Comey Testimony, supra note 43.
45 See, e.g., T. J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING
STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 9 (2007); AM. BAR ASS’N,
TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
DOCTRINE (Aug. 24, 2006); Phillip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the
Use and Abuse of Presidential Signing Statements, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 515, 520
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1,042 provisions by the end of 2006.46 Professor Neil Kinkopf correctly
observed that President Bush’s objections typically took the form of a
declaration that he would use the canon of statutory construction known as
constitutional avoidance to interpret the statute in a constitutional manner – but
that “[a]s a practical matter, this form of interpretation amounts to the same
thing as an assertion that the President will not enforce or be bound by a
particular provision of law.”47 The Bush administration’s legal analyses of the
federal torture and FISA statutes similarly misused the avoidance canon and
essentially declared that the President would not comply with the statutes as
enacted. In addition to misusing the avoidance canon, President Bush’s
signing statements typically were so abbreviated and vague that the precise
nature of his objections and the level of actual statutory nonenforcement
remained hidden from public scrutiny.48
The Bush administration’s actions have deepened public cynicism about the
possibility of any principled executive branch constitutional interpretation, not

(2005); Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws: President Cites Powers of His
Office, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1.
46 See Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and Statutory Interpretation in the Bush
Administration, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 307, 307-08 (2008); Neil Kinkopf & Peter M.
Shane, Index of Presidential Signing Statements: 2001-2007, http://www.acslaw.org/node/
5309.
47 Kinkopf, supra note 46, at 308 n.7; see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court
will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress.”). The most widely known and criticized example is President
Bush’s signing statement regarding the Detainee Treatment Act. Bush initially opposed the
Act and embraced it only under intense congressional and public pressure. Bush’s signing
statement said: “The executive branch shall construe [the provision] relating to detainees, in
a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the
unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional
limitations on the judicial power.” George W. Bush, President, Statement on Signing the
Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in
the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
1918, 1919 (Dec. 30, 2005). For an outstanding discussion of President Bush’s abuse of the
avoidance canon, including as applied to the Detainee Treatment Act, see Trevor W.
Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189,
1246-50 (2006).
48 The General Accounting Office sampled nineteen of Bush’s signing statement
objections and found that “[o]f these 19 provisions, 10 provisions were executed as written,
6 were not, and 3 were not triggered and so there was no agency action to examine.”
Memorandum from Gary Kepplinger, Gen. Counsel, Gov’t Accountability Office, to Robert
C. Byrd, Chairman, S. Comm. on Appropriations, & John Conyers Jr., Chairman, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, Presidential Signing Statements Accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006
Appropriations Acts (June 18, 2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/
appro/308603.htm.
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firmly tethered to judicial doctrine. Skepticism is warranted and can help
spark much-needed reform. But excessive and misguided reactions can
threaten legitimate interpretive practices. For example, President Bush
undoubtedly abused signing statements and as a result gave them a bad name.
The American Bar Association issued a deeply critical report condemning not
only President Bush’s abuses, but also earlier presidential practice, including
what I consider legitimate and valuable uses of signing statements to put the
public on notice of the President’s constitutional views.49 President Bush’s
abuses also have led commentators to reevaluate the previously
uncontroversial and routine executive branch practice of relying on the canon
of constitutional avoidance when interpreting statutes that present
constitutional difficulties.50 Professor H. Jefferson Powell suggested that
Presidents cannot be trusted to apply the canon fairly when their own power is
at stake; he proposed an end to executive branch use of the avoidance canon
“when the issue involves the commander-in-chief power or other questions
about the separation of powers between Congress and the President.”51 The
Bush administration’s actions also have fueled arguments against the
legitimacy of any presidential decision, under any circumstances, not to
comply fully with a statute on the grounds it is unconstitutional.
III. THE PRESIDENT’S INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY
The controversies over torture, FISA, and signing statements and other
issues give new urgency to longstanding, fundamental questions about the
scope of the President’s interpretive authority – questions that should be
informed by, but not myopically focused on, President Bush’s abuses. When
may the President adopt a constitutional interpretation that is not directly
49 Compare AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 45, at 5 (“[O]ppos[ing] as contrary to the rule of
law and our constitutional system of separation of powers, a President’s issuance of signing
statements to claim the authority or state the intention to disregard or decline to enforce all
or part of the law he has signed, or to interpret such a law in a manner inconsistent with the
clear intent of Congress”), with Posting of David Barron, Dawn Johnsen et al., to
Georgetown
Law
Faculty
Blog,
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/
georgetown_university_law/2006/07/thanks_to_the_p.html (July 31, 2006) (disagreeing
with the ABA’s conclusion that the President must invariably either veto a bill containing an
unconstitutional provision or “sign the bill and enforce the unconstitutional provisions” and
identifying Bush’s substantive constitutional interpretations as the true problem with Bush’s
signing statements), and Posting of Laurence Tribe, to Balkinization, http://balkin.
blogspot.com/2006/08/larry-tribe-on-aba-signing-statements.html (Aug. 6, 2006) (“Nothing
in the Constitution’s text, design, or history shows that a president’s only legitimate options
are either to veto an entire bill or to sign it and then enforce it in its entirety regardless of his
good faith views as to the constitutional infirmities either of some part of the bill or of some
distinct set of its possible applications.”).
50 See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 47, at 1189.
51 H. Jefferson Powell, The Executive and the Avoidance Canon, 81 IND. L.J. 1313, 1315
(2006).
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supported by, or that even runs directly counter to, the constitutional views of
the courts or Congress? The President’s constitutionally prescribed oath of
office,52 the Take Care Clause,53 and the Supremacy Clause54 confirm the
President’s obligation to uphold the Constitution through all executive action.
With regard, however, to many contested issues – the scope of the
Commander-in-Chief authority,55 for example, or the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantees of equal protection and liberty56 – the relevant question may
become which branch’s constitutional view should prevail: The Court’s as
expressed in judicial precedent, Congress’s as expressed in its legislative
enactments, the executive branch’s as expressed in Attorney General or OLC
opinions, the sitting President’s own considered views and those of the
President’s lawyers, or some combination?
The answer must acknowledge that a measure of independence in
presidential interpretation is unavoidable. Presidents, with the help of their
lawyers, daily confront issues requiring constitutional and other legal
interpretation, and they often must act without the benefit of clear judicial
guidance. Judicial precedent is especially scarce, and executive branch
precedent particularly developed, on issues of national security and the
separation of powers.57 Jurisdictional requirements such as political question
and standing doctrine, as well as deferential standards of review, may limit,
delay or preclude judicial review. Such limits on review sometimes reflect the
Court’s judgment that the executive or legislative branches bring value to the
interpretive enterprise and are deserving of deference. At other times,
Presidents must act before the Court considers an issue. It therefore is not
feasible within our system to instruct Presidents simply to implement judicial
precedent and never to act upon their own interpretations.
Nor should we desire such a system. Even when the Supreme Court has
spoken, the President (or Congress) may sincerely and passionately disagree:
think of Abraham Lincoln’s views on Dred Scott v. Sandford,58 Franklin D.
Roosevelt on Congress’s authority to enact New Deal legislation, and Ronald
52

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
Id. art. II, § 3.
54 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
55 Id. art. II, § 2.
56 Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
57 In his famous concurring opinion finding President Truman’s wartime seizure of U.S.
steel mills unlawful, Justice Robert Jackson noted the paucity of judicial doctrine on
presidential authority questions:
[A] judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the poverty of really useful
and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they
actually present themselves. . . . And court decisions are indecisive because of the
judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow way.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
58 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 411 (1856).
53
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Reagan on a host of issues including congressional power, federalism,
abortion, and affirmative action.59 In some instances, Presidents may provide
valuable expertise and perspective, or simply an alternative interpretation that
will inspire public debate and constitutional change. Ultimately the President’s
views might be incorporated into judicial doctrine, reflected in statutes, or
otherwise become part of our Nation’s shared understanding of constitutional
meaning. There certainly are times when a majority of the Justices fail to
adopt the best constitutional interpretation. Critics often vehemently disagree
about which precedents count as the failures, but some decisions come to be
universally condemned, such as Dred Scott v. Sandford60 and Plessy v.
Ferguson.61 At times throughout our history, Presidents have stood among the
most important contributors in the ongoing debate about how best to interpret
and apply the Constitution’s core contested provisions.
The better question, therefore, is not whether, but how the President should
participate in the determination of constitutional meaning. Contrary to
President Bush’s indiscriminate approach, legitimacy depends on the
circumstances, and especially on which constitutional authority the President is
exercising to promote his distinctive interpretation. With regard to some
authorities, Presidents possess broad discretion to act based upon constitutional
views they sincerely hold and desire to promote. They may veto bills,
recommend legislation, pardon convicts, file legal briefs, nominate judges,
make speeches, write articles – all premised on their own constitutional
interpretations. Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, for
example, both legitimately used many of these authorities to promote radical
changes in prevailing constitutional doctrine on pressing issues of the day,
though of course their constitutional visions differed dramatically.62
If President Bush had confined the promotion of his extreme executive
authority positions to these highly discretionary authorities – using, for
example, the bully pulpit to make the case for broadened Commander-in-Chief
authority in the war on terror or litigation to urge the Court to defer to his
military determinations – he undoubtedly still would have provoked
controversy. But the controversy would have centered on the substance of his
views, which could have been publicly debated, and less on the legitimacy of
the authorities he used to advance and implement those views. Instead, the

59

See Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional
Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 370-77, 383-405
(2003) [hereinafter Johnsen, Presidential Influences].
60 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 411.
61 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62 See Johnsen, Presidential Influences, supra note 59, at 370-77, 383-405.
Other
Presidents typically cited as supporting relatively strong executive authority to act on
distinctive constitutional views include Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Andrew
Johnson, Abraham Lincoln and Richard Nixon.
See Johnsen, Presidential NonEnforcement, supra note 20, at 19-21; infra text accompanying notes 79-81.
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Bush administration repeatedly has acted in the context most difficult to
justify: claiming the authority to act contrary to the dictates of federal statutes.
And in at least several notable cases, the administration sought to keep those
very claims secret.
IV. THE PRESIDENT’S NONENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
In addition to general questions of interpretive authority, President Bush’s
policies squarely raise the perhaps surprisingly unsettled and nuanced issue:
when, if ever, may the President decline to comply with a federal statute? One
common response is the one Senators unsuccessfully sought to elicit from
Attorney General Michael Mukasey during his confirmation hearings: the
President is obligated to comply with all laws passed by Congress and signed
into law; presidential disclaimers in signing statements to the contrary are
entirely and invariably illegitimate. Senators were clearly right to condemn the
Bush administration’s unjustified violations of federal statutes and to seek a
dramatic shift in attitude from Alberto Gonzales’ successor. But Mukasey also
was right to avoid an unqualified statement that Presidents must always
enforce statutes as enacted. The correct answer to this enduring question is
just not that simple.
As Mukasey appropriately noted, some statutes fail to comply with the
Constitution, which the President also is obligated to uphold. On occasion,
such conflicts call upon Presidents to make difficult judgments that could
profoundly affect vital national interests such as national security or
fundamental liberties. Neither Mukasey in his testimony, nor the Bush
administration, however, has detailed how they believe the President should
resolve perceived conflicts between the Constitution and statutes. Despite
President Bush’s unprecedented objections to the constitutionality of statutory
provisions, the Bush administration has never explained its view of the nature
or extent of the President’s nonenforcement authority. Nor has it expressly
disavowed the dominant executive branch tradition and practice that
recognizes only highly limited nonenforcement authority, an approach that
OLC most recently embraced and embodied in detailed guidelines in 1994.63
Although the Bush administration has not publicly replaced the 1994
nonenforcement guidelines, its actions have demonstrated unambiguously that
it does not believe the President’s nonenforcement authority is so limited.
Implicit in some Bush administration actions and OLC opinions is the position
that the President may go as far as to act contrary to any statute that he believes
violates the Constitution. This resolution, like the other extreme of invariable
mandatory statutory enforcement, has superficial appeal: the Constitution of
course is supreme law64 that the President is obligated to uphold, including by
oath of office.65 But an approach that sanctions routine nonenforcement of
63
64
65

1994 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 19, at 203.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
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arguably unconstitutional statutes would, like mandatory enforcement,
oversimplify the President’s constitutional obligation by ignoring competing
constitutional values and longstanding practice.66
Moreover, routine
nonenforcement dangerously and irresponsibly aggrandizes presidential power.
At the close of Bill Clinton’s presidency, I wrote an article in which I
explained why, despite their superficial appeal, neither of the approaches at the
extremes – mandatory statutory enforcement or routine nonenforcement –
comports with the Constitution’s text or structure or with executive branch
practice.67 I concluded that the Constitution is best interpreted as creating a
strong but not irrebuttable presumption in favor of enforcement of
constitutionally objectionable statutes. Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti
described this strong presumption well, stating “it is almost always the case
that [the Attorney General] can best discharge the responsibilities of his office
by defending and enforcing the Act of Congress.”68
To identify those rare cases in which nonenforcement is justified requires
“the President to make sometimes difficult evaluations that depend on the
specific statutory provision and the circumstances surrounding its
enactment.”69 I developed a framework for making nonenforcement decisions
that addresses both the broad theoretical principles and the specific practical
factors that should guide particular decisions.70 I will not repeat that analysis
66 Some support for routine nonenforcement authority may be found in the legal
memoranda, though not the practice, of President George H.W. Bush’s administration. See
Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 18, 31-36 (1992); Issues Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization Bill,
14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 37, 46-52 (1990). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook,
Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (1990); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
67 See Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 20, at 10-11; see also Johnsen,
Functional Departmentalism, supra note 20, at 108 (arguing for a “functional
departmentalist” approach that posits “that determinations about interpretive authority
require close attention to the particular constitutional question at issue and the context in
which it arises”).
68 1980 Civiletti Memorandum, supra note 19, at 55.
69 Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 20, at 10; see also David Barron,
Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-Enforcement Power, 63
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 65 (2000).
70 See Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 20, at 52-54.
Prior
administrations have identified as among the most relevant factors whether the statutory
provision was clearly unconstitutional, whether nonenforcement would increase the prospect
of judicial review of the provision’s constitutionality, and whether the provision encroached
upon executive authority. See 1980 Civiletti Memorandum, supra note 19; 1994 Dellinger
Memorandum, supra note 19. I previously assessed these three factors and developed a
series of six questions to guide particular nonenforcement decisions: (1) How clear is the
law’s constitutional defect?; (2) Does the President possess institutional expertise relevant to
the constitutional issue and what are the relative interpretative abilities of the three
branches?; (3) Did Congress actually consider the constitutional issue when enacting the
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here at any length, but will draw upon it to evaluate the Bush administration’s
performance.
Two principles should guide Presidents and their lawyers when
contemplating executive interpretive authority, particularly when confronting
constitutionally objectionable statutes. Both principles follow from the
President’s obligation to “preserve, protect and defend”71 the Constitution as
supreme law and to “take Care”72 that the executive branch faithfully upholds
it. And both principles confirm that, contrary to suggestions from the Bush
administration, this obligation is not best understood as allowing Presidents to
act routinely on their own interpretations of the Constitution, particularly in the
context of statutory nonenforcement.
First, Presidents should premise action on their own distinctive
interpretations only in ways that will promote the Constitution as best
interpreted, and not merely their own preferred constitutional interpretations.
The Constitution is distinct from the President’s constitutional interpretations,
just as it is distinct from judicial doctrine.73 Presidents can be expected to
misinterpret the Constitution no less (indeed far more) than the Supreme Court.
A fundamental premise of our constitutional culture is that the courts play a
special role in constitutional interpretation, and for good reason – including
because they enjoy greater protections than the political branches against the
corrupting influences of narrow political and policy objectives. The President
should act with due humility and a recognition that the President is but one
participant – certainly an important one – in the process of achieving the best
interpretations of the Constitution. The President, therefore, should afford due
deference to judicial doctrine, while recognizing that doctrine itself sometimes
contemplates and ultimately benefits from distinctive presidential
interpretations. The President also should respect the expressed views of
Congress and adhere to the well-established presumption of the
constitutionality of statutes. When Presidents do act upon their independent
law?; (4) What is the likelihood of judicial review and how would nonenforcement affect
that likelihood?; (5) How serious is the harm that would result from enforcement?; and (6)
Is repeal of the statute or nondefense of the statute against legal challenge an effective
alternative to nonenforcement? See id. at 43-54. In this discussion, I focus on the first
factor.
71 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
72 Id. art. II, § 3.
73 Clearly a President may not distort constitutional meaning to serve desired policy ends
through action premised on constitutional arguments that he believes to be merely plausible.
Even beyond that, he may not always act upon sincerely held constitutional views. For a
more detailed discussion of the constitutional obligation of Presidents and their lawyers to
strive for “accurate and honest appraisal[s] of applicable law, even if that advice will
constrain the administration’s pursuit of desired policies,” see Johnsen, Faithfully Executing
the Laws, supra note 2, at 1580-82 (citing WALTER E. DELLINGER, DAWN JOHNSEN ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL (2004), reprinted in 54 UCLA L. REV.
1559 app. 2, at 1604).
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constitutional interpretations, adherence to appropriate processes in the
formulation and announcement of those views is critical to safeguarding
against policy preferences infecting principled interpretation. In the end, what
this first principle means for the President’s interpretive authority – how the
President can best contribute to the development of constitutional meaning –
will vary with context. At a minimum, the shared and collaborative nature of
the interpretive enterprise requires the President to explain publicly and with
detailed reasoning any actions premised on constitutional views that conflict
with those of Congress or the Court.
Second, the President must respect the constitutional functions of the other
branches of government. In considering whether and how to promote
distinctive constitutional views, the President must not impermissibly infringe
upon the Supreme Court’s judicial power or Congress’s legislative power.74
For example, if Presidents were to refuse to comply with a court order
whenever they disagreed with the court’s constitutional analysis, the
judiciary’s core function would be gravely impaired. Longstanding practice
and academic commentary almost universally condemn presidential defiance
of a court order, even when the President’s constitutional disagreement is
principled and sincere.75 Although not quite as likely to be unsupportable as
the violation of a court order, a presidential refusal to enforce a federal statute
is highly suspect. The Constitution sets forth a detailed process for
lawmaking, a “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure,”

74 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) (“[T]hese features of the
Act . . . ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.”);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856-57 (1986) (“[T]he
separation of powers question presented in this litigation is whether Congress impermissibly
undermined . . . the role of the Judicial Branch.”); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425, 443 (1977) (“[I]n determining whether [an] Act disrupts the proper balance between
the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”).
75 President Abraham Lincoln captured well the distinction between, on the one hand, the
obligation to comply with a court order and, on the other hand, the authority to act in other
contexts on a constitutional understanding that is counter to that announced by a majority of
Supreme Court Justices. Lincoln was speaking not of presidential authority, but the
analogous authority of a member of Congress to legislate based on independent
constitutional interpretations, in particular contrary to the Court’s Dred Scott decision:
I have expressed heretofore, and I now repeat, my opposition to the Dred Scott
decision, but I should be allowed to state the nature of that opposition . . . . What is
fairly implied by the term Judge Douglas has used “resistance to the decision?” I do
not resist it. If I wanted to take Dred Scott from his master, I would be interfering with
property . . . . But I am doing no such thing as that, but all that I am doing is refusing
to obey it as a political rule. If I were in Congress, and a vote should come up on a
question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new territory, in spite of that Dred
Scott decision, I would vote that it should . . . . [W]e will try to reverse that decision.
Senator Abraham Lincoln, Address in Chicago (July 10, 1858), in THE COMPLETE LINCOLNDOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 36 (Paul M. Angle ed., 1991).
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that contemplates presidential involvement prior to enactment to ensure the
constitutionality of legislation.76 Presidents should work with Congress to
correct constitutional problems in draft legislation, veto unconstitutional bills
whenever possible, and also work with Congress to repeal and correct
unconstitutional provisions. If, instead, Presidents were routinely to disregard
laws they found constitutionally objectionable, they would circumvent this
legislative process and threaten Congress’s core legislative authority.
These principles establish a strong presumption against presidential
nonenforcement, but they do not preclude it in all circumstances. The
strongest context for legitimate nonenforcement occurs when Congress enacts
statutory provisions that are blatantly unconstitutional under governing
Supreme Court precedent. Congress, for example, has repeatedly passed
provisions that purport to give to congressional committees or a single House
of Congress powers that the Court expressly held, in its well-known Chadha
decision, must be exercised by Congress as a whole, consistent with the
constitutionally prescribed process for lawmaking.77 Again, Presidents should
veto unconstitutional bills, but most statutory provisions are not presented for
the President’s consideration as stand-alone provisions. When Congress
presents a Chadha violation or other unconstitutional provision as a small part
of an important omnibus bill such as an agency appropriation or program
authorization, one among perhaps many hundreds of provisions, a presidential
veto may be exceedingly, even prohibitively, costly. As a matter of practice,
when Congress has not heeded presidential requests to correct clearly
unconstitutional provisions prior to presentment, Presidents often have signed
such legislation into law and announced in signing statements that they will not
comply with the unconstitutional portion of the statute. Similarly, Presidents
stop enforcing laws already on the books that are analogous in relevant
respects to laws the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional. Here,
nonenforcement does not promote distinctive presidential interpretations, but
enforces settled Supreme Court doctrine.78
The Bush administration, of course, has not simply applied settled judicial
doctrine and refused to enforce clearly unconstitutional statutes, but has sought
to expand presidential power far beyond what the Court has recognized. This
fact, though highly relevant, does not alone render President Bush’s actions
clearly illegitimate. In several extraordinary cases, history has vindicated
decisions by Presidents to act in advance of the Court, to violate statutes that

76

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
See id. at 958.
78 As Professor Neil Kinkopf has observed: “Congress has enacted hundreds of
legislative vetoes since Chadha, and not even members of Congress expect the President to
veto such legislation or to enforce the patently unconstitutional legislative veto provisions.”
Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and the President’s Authority To Refuse To Enforce the
Law, ADVANCE: J. AM. CONST. SOC’Y ISSUE GROUPS, Spring 2007, at 5, 7, available at
http://www.acslaw.org/node/2965.
77
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the Court only later recognized as unconstitutional. President Thomas
Jefferson, for example, declared the Sedition Act of 1798 unconstitutional a
century and a half before the Supreme Court expressly agreed with him; based
on his then-controversial interpretation, President Jefferson pardoned all those
convicted and refused to initiate any new prosecutions.79 Andrew Johnson was
impeached in part for firing the Secretary of War based on a constitutional
interpretation with which the Court finally agreed almost sixty years later.80
The history of Chadha-type violations itself includes an historic example of
a President who, confronted with a constitutional question years before the
Court, signed a bill into law notwithstanding his view that it contained an
unconstitutional provision. More than four decades before the Court decided
Chadha, Congress presented President Franklin D. Roosevelt with a bill that
included a provision authorizing Congress to rescind specified authorities
granted to the President by concurrent resolution (that is, without presentment
to the President for signature). Although he believed the provision violated the
Constitution, an interpretation with which the Court ultimately agreed in
Chadha, President Roosevelt felt compelled not to exercise his veto because
the objectionable provision was part of the Lend Lease Act, which he believed
was critical to the early World War II efforts of the Allies. President Roosevelt
signed the Lend Lease Act and asked his Attorney General Robert Jackson to
write a memorandum memorializing Roosevelt’s constitutional concerns.81
When I addressed this issue back in 2000, my principal case study was one
of the most difficult such decisions of Bill Clinton’s presidency: to sign into
law and then enforce the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996, which
included a provision that directed the President to discharge from the military
all individuals infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).82 The
HIV provision was part of an omnibus bill, and Congress appeared to pay little
attention to it prior to enactment. The bill’s House sponsor tacked the
provision on late in the legislative process for the stated, and entirely mistaken,
reason that HIV is invariably contracted through misconduct in violation of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice: illegal drug use, homosexual activity, or sex
with prostitutes. President Clinton believed this stated purpose was not only
misguided, but also illegitimate, and that to enforce this provision would
violate the equal protection rights of the more than one thousand armed forces

79

See Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 20, at 20.
See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926); Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d
Sess. 200 (1868).
81 Interestingly, Jackson did not share Roosevelt’s view that the provision was
unconstitutional. Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353,
1354-57 (1953).
82 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §
567, 110 Stat. 186, 328 (1996) (repealed 1996 and codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1177
(Supp. IV 1998)). For a more detailed analysis of this example, see Johnsen, Presidential
Non-Enforcement, supra note 20, at 7-8, 54-60.
80
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members who would be discharged. He also believed it would diminish
military effectiveness. Clinton initially vetoed the bill, but when Congress
passed it a second time, still including the HIV provision, Clinton felt he could
not afford to veto it again because it appropriated 265 billion dollars for
military programs “of great importance” to national security.83 Instead, he
issued a signing statement to publicly describe his constitutional concerns and
declare his intentions: he would work with Congress to repeal the provision
before its effective date and if that failed, he would reluctantly enforce the
provision but not defend it in the litigation that was certain to ensue.84
Ultimately, the repeal effort was successful and Clinton did not have to
discharge anyone.85
In comparison with the prevailing norms and practices of long history,
President Bush’s failures are evident and glaring. First, however, it should be
noted that some of President Bush’s constitutional objections expressed in
signing statements have been in the mainstream of presidential practice. For
example, as of 2006, President Bush had objected to 235 provisions that
contained legislative vetoes that were unconstitutional under Chadha. 86 Some
critiques, such as that of the American Bar Association, have failed to
articulate clearly and fully the proper use of signing statements and instead
have sweepingly condemned their use, by this or any administration, to express
constitutional objections.87
This misdirected criticism could have the
unfortunate result of chilling a legitimate presidential practice by which the
public gains information about executive branch positions – which is
particularly valuable with a highly secretive administration. For example,
presidential candidate John McCain announced in February 2008 that if
elected, he would “never, never, never, never” issue a signing statement,88
which is not the appropriate remedy for what is a genuine problem. Even if
they were to end entirely the practice of publicly announcing constitutional
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See Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
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objections in signing statements, Presidents could continue to act contrary to
statutes in secret.
That said, measured against the twin principles of promoting the best
constitutional interpretations and respecting the constitutional functions of the
other branches, the Bush administration has failed utterly. President Bush has
abused signing statements at the expense of the constitutionally preferred
methods of working with Congress to remedy constitutional problems prior to
presentment and, where that fails, seriously considering the possibility of a
presidential veto. Moreover, President Bush’s signing statements, very far
from only identifying clearly unconstitutional provisions, often advance
unconventional and extreme views of presidential power that do not justify
presidential nonenforcement of a duly enacted provision of law. On 363
occasions President Bush objected to provisions that he found might conflict
with the President’s constitutional authority “‘to supervise the unitary
executive branch.’”89 In numerous other statements he declared that he would
interpret provisions to be consistent with his authority as Commander in Chief.
These examples reveal another serious problem with President Bush’s use of
signing statements, one that complicates evaluation of his performance:
President Bush’s signing statements typically are so brief and formulaic that
they do not actually reveal the nature of his objection or plans for
(non)enforcement.
The Bush administration’s “unitary executive” and Commander-in-Chief
theories, in my view, are clearly wrong and threaten both the constitutionally
prescribed balance of powers and individual rights. In any event, they do not
provide a legitimate basis for the extreme step of statutory nonenforcement. In
order to understand, however, what President Bush is saying in his signing
statements, one has to be familiar with his constitutional views as revealed
elsewhere – not an easy task with an administration shrouded in secrecy.
President Bush’s violations of FISA and statutes that prohibit torture and other
extreme interrogation methods are known to the public only because of leaks.
The administration continues to keep secret much of its legal analyses of those
issues, and possibly of many other vital issues. Congress cannot adequately
perform its constitutional legislative function if the President refuses to explain
fully the basis for his claimed authority to refuse to enforce statutes as enacted,
or even to notify Congress that he is not enforcing the law. And the President
cannot justify executive action premised on distinctive presidential views as
contributing to the development of constitutional meaning if he refuses to share
and debate the substance of his constitutional views with Congress and the
American people.
Most fundamental, the processes by which the Bush administration has
formulated and promoted some of its most consequential constitutional
positions, especially on matters of national security, reflect a profound
disrespect for Congress and the laws it has enacted in conformity with the
89
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Constitution and on behalf of the American people. Such disrespect would be
irresponsible regardless of the method by which an administration sought to
promote its distinctive legal views, even if only in public speeches; it is
indefensible when an administration seeks to justify the extraordinary authority
to refuse to enforce a duly enacted statutory limitation on executive action.
Unlike President Bush, prior Presidents who strongly advocated a measure
of executive interpretive independence typically spoke directly and publicly to
the issue and worked with Congress. Jefferson’s unilateral halting of
prosecutions under the Sedition Act of 1798 was a temporary measure, for the
Act soon expired and Congress agreed with Jefferson and declined to
reauthorize it.90 Some within and without the Bush administration cite the
actions of Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt as precedent for claims of
emergency powers, but as Jack Goldsmith explains, unlike Bush, neither
Lincoln nor Roosevelt were “executive power ideologues” with an “underlying
commitment to expanding presidential power.”91 Rather, Lincoln and
Roosevelt typically sought public and congressional support (albeit
occasionally after the fact) for the aggressive actions they thought necessary to
preserve the Union and save the world from totalitarianism, respectively.
As Jack Goldsmith, Charlie Savage, and others have documented, President
Bush sought instead to go it alone at every turn, in maximum secrecy, and not
only as an interim, emergency measure. He sought congressional authorization
and necessary changes in existing legislative limits only when forced by the
Supreme Court. President Bush, and even more, Vice President Cheney,
entered office with an agenda to leave the presidency stronger than when they
took office, to remedy what they perceived as an inappropriate diminishing of
presidential power in response to President Nixon’s abuses of power.92 That
agenda drove and infected the Bush administration’s legal interpretations and
undermined its commitment to the rule of law.93
Nixon actually is the most relevant precedent here, for his views on the
scope of executive authority certainly are far closer to those of the Bush
administration than were the views of the Presidents the Bush administration
understandably prefers to cite. Nixon famously said in an interview after he
left office, “when the President does it that means that it is not illegal”:
If the president, for example, approves something because of the national
security, or in this case because of a threat to internal peace and order of
significant magnitude, then the president's decision in that instance is one
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that enables those who carry it out, to carry it out without violating a
law.94
The Bush administration’s aggressive views of presidential power are a bit
more subtle than so directly claiming that the President may simply disregard
laws on the grounds of protecting national security interests, but they
effectively achieve the same end. The Bush approach has been to press
executive branch lawyers for “‘forward-leaning’”95 legal advice on national
security matters, and in particular for interpretations of the President’s
Commander-in-Chief and other constitutional authorities, to empower the
President to act contrary to federal statutory requirements. It is ironic that
Bush administration officials, from the earliest days in office, embarked on a
mission to reclaim sweeping presidential power they viewed as improperly lost
after Nixon, but ultimately may have jeopardized legitimate presidential
authorities.
CONCLUSION
The harm to the rule of law that our Nation has endured during the Bush
presidency has inspired desperately needed reexamination of fundamental
questions of presidential authority, including the authority to interpret the
Constitution. The Bush administration’s excessive and illegitimate claims of
nonenforcement authority, the most difficult of contexts, present a serious
challenge for the future of executive authority. Bush has demonstrated the
fatal weaknesses of routine nonenforcement, strengthened the hand of those
who argue for mandatory enforcement, and posed a serious challenge to the
past practice of even rare use of nonenforcement authority because of its
indeterminacy and demonstrated potential for abuse. In the end, I continue to
believe that our Constitution is best served by our Nation’s past practice of
allowing presidential nonenforcement of constitutionally objectionable statutes
but only in rare and exceptional circumstances. The lesson we should draw
from the Bush administration is not that we should dramatically alter our
understanding of longstanding presidential authorities. Rather, it is the urgent
need for more effective safeguards and checks from both within and without
the executive branch to preclude any future recurrence of the Bush
administration’s appalling abuses.96

94 Interview by David Frost with Richard Nixon (May 19, 1977), reprinted in N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 1977, at A16.
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